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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

RESPONDENTS•
BRIEF ON APPEAL

vs,
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, HEART MARKETING
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, in its capacity as general partner of TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD.,
LEISURE SPORTS, INC., a Utah corporation, and DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 870366
Argument Priority
Classification: 14b

Defendants-Respondents.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of this appeal
is vested pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure [hereinafter U.R.C.P.].

The case history recited

by Appellants under the heading "Statement of the Case", found in
Appellants1 brief [hereinafter AB] at pages one through four, is,
by and large, accurate insofar as it comprises a basic chronological recapitulation of the pleadings found in the record on
appeal.

As a result, no additional statement need be added here.

(See Rule 24(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondents believe the following issues constitute the
appropriate

scope

of

judicial

review

in

the

instant

case:

I.Appropriate standards of appellate review compel the affirmation
of the trial court's judgment; this affirmation is further compelled by an examination of the credibility of Appellant Crane.
II.

No agreement was ever timely reached between the parties; the
mail-box rule is inapplicable in the instant case.

III. Respondents' offer was effectively withdrawn on February 22,
1985.
IV.

Appellants' acceptance of Respondents' offer was conditional
and constituted little more than a counteroffer.

V.

Equity compelled that Appellants not prevail in the instant
suit.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Where necessary, Respondents shall cite to appropriate
constitutional and statutory provisions within the body of the
brief and will quote the same, unless otherwise noted, in their
entirety.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' brief properly recites the chronology of the
case.

(See AB "Statement of the Case" at 1-4.)

Furthermore, the

following two paragraphs, once again excerpted from Appellants'
brief, accurately identify the nominal parties in this case:

2

TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, is a Utah limited
partnership which is in the business of real
estate development and sales in southern Utah.
HEART MARKETING, is a Utah corporation which
serves as general or managing partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. LEISURE SPORTS, is also
a Utah corporation. Mr. Barry Church is the
President of HEART MARKETING as well as
LEISURE SPORTS.
Mr. Russell Gallian is a
shareholder of LEISURE SPORTS.
CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited partner of
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, owning twenty-five percent (25%) of the partnership interest. (AB
at 4, citations omitted)
In addition to the above, Russell J. Gallian, Esq.
[hereinafter Gallian], was at all relevant times Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Leisure Sports, Inc. [hereinafter Leisure
Sports] and also acted in the capacity of its attorney.
Dixie Title Company [hereinafter Dixie Title] was the
designated escrow agent for depository purposes in reference to
the

initial

offer by

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd.

[hereinafter

Timberbrook] to purchase the limited partnership interest held by
Clifford G. Crane [hereinafter Crane].
Manager of Dixie Title Company.

Doug Westbrook is the

Bonnie Crane is the wife of

Clifford Crane.
The foregoing appropriately identifies the named parties
and, where applicable, their principals and agents. This summation
is perhaps necessary so that the varying interests of those who
have given testimony in this case may be appropriately identified
throughout the transcript of the two-day trial. All parties have
been properly joined.
As the basic overview of the facts in this case may be
3

gleaned from the reporter's transcript of Judge Eves1

ruling

coupled with the executed findings of fact and conclusions of law
themselves, Respondents have attached

these documents

appendix as Addendums "1" and "2," respectively.

in the

(Cf.. R at 332,

305-15) For purposes of this appeal, however, Respondents believe
that the core of the trial court's judgment, appended hereto, is
bottomed in the testimony of four people, three of whom are
attorneys.
Timberbrook, throughout all relevant times herein, was
represented by Mr. Russell Gallian, who also served as the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Leisure Sports, the proposed purchaser
of Crane's interest in Timberbrook.

Crane was represented at all

relevant times by Mr. Dean Mixon, Esq., a California attorney,
whose deposition was taken at his offices and published for
purposes of trial.

(D-29)

In Utah, Crane was represented by Mr.

Willard R. Bishop, Esq.
As the trial court's primary function below was to weigh
the veracity of those testifying before it, it is important to note
that in those particular and peculiar aspects of Crane's testimony
where his attorneys might otherwise have verified or corroborated
his statements, their testimony ran at odds thereto.

This point

is more particularly set forth as part of Argument I, infra.
Indeed, Crane's attorneys not only corroborated the testimony of
Mr. Gallian, but provided, by means of impeachment, a substantial
basis from which the trial court could readily disregard all of the
material testimony proffered by Crane. With the foregoing in mind,
4

the following facts appear probative to the trial court's decision
in favor of Respondents.
* * *

Prior to 1984, Appellant Clifford Crane purchased a 25%
interest in Timberbrook.

(Finding of Fact No. 2)

In late 1984,

Leisure Sports and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., the
general partner of Timberbrook, desired to repurchase the interest
of Crane in said partnership.

(Finding of Fact No. 3)

As of

November 13, 1984, Timberbrook and Crane had reached in principle
an oral agreement which, to be valid and enforceable, was to be
reduced to writing, signed by the Cranes, and deposited by them at
Dixie Title along with executed assignments of their partnership
interests. These requirements were expressly necessary to complete
the transaction.

(Finding of Fact No. 4) Indeed, as forwarded to

the Cranes by Gallian on behalf of Leisure Sports, the proposals
to purchase Appellants' partnership interest had already been
signed in good faith by the principals of Leisure Sports.

(See P-

7, P-8, and P-9.)
No consideration had been tendered by Crane in exchange
for the offer to purchase his interest, nor for the drafting or
transmittal of these documents.

As set forth, the documents

propose an exchange of Crane's limited partnership interest for
$175,000.00 in cash, and unit 210 in building 1 of Timberbrook
Condominiums.

(P-8 and P-9)

The agreement and closing thereon

were expressly made contingent on Crane's execution and delivery
to Dixie Title of these documents.
5

(Finding of Fact No. 7)

Indeed, both Exhibits P-8 and P-9 expressly dictate to Crane that
the assignment of his limited partnership interest "shall be
deposited with escrow agent to be delivered to buyer upon closing.11
(See P-8 and P-9; cf. Finding of Fact No. 7.)
Since this exchange contemplated both the transfer of
monies and title to a condominium, the matters fell squarely within
Utah's statute of frauds, found in Title 25 of the Utah Code. As
of November 20, 1984, Respondents had already caused to be placed
in escrow $175,000.00, and Mr. Gallian had further obtained, as
required by P-8 and P-9, the release of Appellants from a loan
guarantee earlier executed by Appellants.

(See P-6; cf. P-14.)

As stated by Judge Eves at R. 332 at 3, however, "[s]ome of those
items had not been discussed nor settled in the oral agreement."
(Id., emphasis added)
After Crane returned to California, he became dissatisfied with the $175,000.00 or the monetary element of Respondents1
offer and retained Mr. Mixon, his California attorney.

(Deposition

of Dean Mixon, D-29 at 16, 30, and 31 [hereinafter Mixon])
Mixon initially contacted Gallian on January 4, 1985.

Mr.

His "sole

purpose in the phone call was to try to get additional money out
of the buyer."

(Mixon at 32)

This call occurred at 3:01 in the

afternoon and lasted for ten minutes.

Immediately thereafter,

Mixon spoke to Crane for 15 minutes, and one minute later to
Attorney Hans Chamberlain, of Cedar City, Utah, for five minutes.
One minute thereafter, Mixon contacted Mr. Willard Bishop, Appellants' counsel.

Crane subsequently retained Bishop to seek a
6

complete accounting from Timberbrook, ultimately

initiating a

lawsuit through Bishop's office for this purpose. The trial court
took judicial notice of this suit, filed in Iron County, Civil No.
85-066.

(Reporter's Transcript August 4, 1987, at 42 [hereinafter

Tl]; see also phone records of Dean Mixon, page 6, for January 17,
1985, appended to Mixon deposition D-29.)

Mixonfs phone records

further show that he had no further contact with Bishop through
March 16, 1985.

Pursuing Appellants' suit for an accounting,

Bishop forwarded letters, with the express written authorization
of Mr. Crane attached thereto, requesting a comprehensive accounting of the limited partnership pursuant to Section 48-2-10 of the
Utah Code.

(P-10-A and P-ll-A)

Meanwhile, Mixon continued his efforts to "up the price11
in Respondents' offer to purchase Crane's interest previously
received in November, though Bishop was totally unaware of this
offer!

(Mixon at 16, 30, 31, 32, 44, and 47)

confirmed Mixon's testimony at trial.

Gallian expressly

(Tl at 261-62)

Bishop ultimately filed his suit for an accounting on
February 12, 1985.

On the 13th of February, he received P-13, a

letter drafted by Gallian and directed to Bishop in response to
Bishop's earlier letters.

(P-10-A and P-ll-A)

When Bishop

received this letter, he was as yet uninformed that Mixon was
negotiating in California for the sale of Crane's partnership
interest to Respondents.

(Tl at 248)

Gallian still assumed that

the various problems with Crane had been solved.

(P-13)

After

receiving Gallian's letter on February 13, 1985, Bishop telephoned
7

Crane.

Judge Eves expressly found that during this conversation

with his Utah counsel on February 13, 1985, "Mr. Crane told Mr.
Bishop that he had not yet accepted the outstanding offer; that he
wanted to go ahead with the accounting."

(R 332 at 4; see also Tl

at 249-50.) Judge Eves clearly found that these actions indicated
that Crane "did not feel that he had a binding agreement at the
time, but was in the position of being in receipt of an offer,
which he was either free to accept or reject."

(R 332 at 4;

Finding of Fact No. 8)
Upon discovering that the accounting lawsuit had been
filed (Iron County Civil No. 85-066) on February 12, 1985, Gallian
telephoned Bishop on February 15, 1985, expressing extreme displeasure

over

the

status

of

the

November, 1984, purchase offer.

negotiations

regarding

(Tl at 251, 276-77)

the

Bishop's

recollection of this conversation was so clear that he spontaneously confirmed Gallian's statement regarding the same while
Gallian was being questioned by Mr. Hughes.
letter of February

18, 1985, according

(Tl 277)

Bishop's

to Bishop, correctly

memorialized Bishop's conversation with Appellant Crane, Bishop's
client, and, indeed, the information Bishop passed on to Gallian
on February 15, 1985.

The text of that letter is telling:

I received your letter on 13 February 1985 and
spoke with Mr. Clifford G. Crane on the same
day.
His information to me was that your
people have made him an offer, but that he has
not yet accepted it, and desires to proceed
[with the accounting suit] until he does
accept your settlement offer, if he does, in
fact, accept it. (P-15-A)
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A postscript to that letter indicates that it was dictated before
Gallian and Bishop spoke, but the substance of their oral conversation was no different.
Not surprisingly, Crane vehemently denied at trial that
he hired Mixon to obtain more money, and further stated to the
trial court that Bishop's letter of February 18, 1985, did not then
correctly state Mr. Crane's state of mind.

(See Tl at 6, 67, 69,

71-73, 87-88, 127, 129, 131, and 138.)
Only days before, on February 11, 1985, and simultaneous
to the drafting of P-13 to Bishop, Gallian had sent a copy of the
substitution of guarantor, personally certifying its authenticity,
to Mr. Mixon.

(P-12) In that letter, Gallian reaffirmed the offer

and re-expressed the parties' understanding
execute the documents and that

that Crane would

fl

[u]pon receipt the escrow agent

will disburse $175,000.00 to your clients and Barry Church will
execute a warranty deed on behalf of the partnership for the
condo."

Gallian1s concurrent letter to Bishop, with similar

naivete, indicated that he and Mr. Church were still "awaiting
documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title Company, at which
time the closing will be completed and Mr. Crane will no longer be
associated with Timberbrook."

(P-13)

Both of these letters

restated the simple condition that Crane be required to execute and
deposit with the escrow agent Dixie Title the initial offer sent
to Crane and received at trial as P-8 and P-9.
On the same day that Bishop mailed Gallian his letter
indicating Crane's nonacceptance of Respondents' offer, Mixon
9

testified that he drafted P-18, a letter to Dixie Title Company,
enclosing the originals of P-8 and P-9, but additionally setting
forth three conditions to the closing of the transaction. Primary
among these conditions was a request that the escrow agent independently receive a separate affirmation of the validity of the
substitution of guarantor document earlier enclosed in and verified
by Gallian's letter.

(See P-12; cf. P-18.)

Mixon conceded that

his cover letter was firm and that, without dispositive proof of
the authenticity of the substitution of guarantor, it was not
Mixonfs intent that the deal close.

(See Mixon at 22-24, 37.)

Crane conceded that Mixon not only requested independent verification, but an original of the substitution itself.

(Tl at 146)

Again, not unsurprisingly, Crane testified at trial, "I was not a
party to writing those three conditions. My attorney wrote those.
. . . We talked about it since then.
before he wrote it, though."

We didn't talk about it

(Tl at 170) Crane conceded at trial,

however, that, without independent verification of the substitution, he would not have closed.

(Tl at 149)

Initially, there was some confusion as to whether Mixon's
letter with its contingencies and enclosures were deposited with
Dixie Title prior to February 22, 1985.

(P-18)

Upon examination

of the Dixie Title's files, however, Respondents' counsel discovered the envelope from Weinfield and Mixon, which was marked as
P-19-A. Mailed by regular domestic mail, the stamp from the Santa
Ana, Orange County, California post office indicates a mailing in
the p.m. of February 21, 1985.

(P-19-A)
10

Corroborative thereto,

at approximately 6:07 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, on February 21,
1985, Mixon telephoned Crane at Crane's house. Mixon conceded that
this 11-minute phone call was probably to notify Crane that Mixon
had mailed the letter, with its enclosures, earlier in the afternoon.

(Mixon at 54-55)
After Barry Church was served on February 13, 1985, in

the Timberbrook accounting suit, Iron County Civil No. 85-066, and
subsequent to Gallian's conversation with Bishop on February 15,
1985, Gallian and Church spoke extensively, as they were together
opening up, for President's Day weekend, a resort in southern Utah
commonly known as Mt. Holly.

(Tl at 279-80)

Exasperated by

Crane's contrary tactics, Church and Gallian decided to withdraw
the offer to purchase Crane's interest.
On Friday morning, February 22, 1985, Gallian received
a phone call from Crane.

Exhausted from the weekend, Gallian

initially had failed to follow up on a personal commitment to Barry
Church to notify Crane that the deal was off.

(Tl at 276-80) And,

though shocked at receiving telephonic contact from Crane, Gallian
immediately advised Crane that the deal was off, testifying to the
following:
I answered the phone, and as he started the
speech, I told him words to the effect, "Mr.
Crane, before you start, I need to tell you
that the deal is off." (Tl at 281)
Gallian further testified that Crane never advised him
that Mixon had mailed the documents the day before.

(Tl at 282-83)

The thrust of Gallian's statements in this conversation, however,

11

was unequivocal, and Gallian subsequently advised Doug Westbrook
on the same morning at Dixie Title that the offer was no longer
open for acceptance and that the deal was off.
195, 211, 223-25, and 283)

(Tl at 182, 185,

Westbrook subsequently testified that

Dixie Title did not receive the documents forwarded by Mixon until
the 25th or 2 6th of February during the following week.
at 225)

(Tl

Crane's initial telephone call with Gallian took three

minutes and occurred at 11:57 a.m. Eastern Standard Time.

(P-22)

Forty minutes later, at 12:37 p.m. Eastern Standard time, Crane
sent a mailgram

(P-21) attempting to unilaterally withdraw the

conditions set forth in Mixon's cover letter mailed February 21,
1985.

(See P-21; cf. P-18.)

This initial telegram was sent only

16 minutes after a phone call in which Gallian had further indicated to Crane that he did not desire to revive or other-wise reopen
the offer for acceptance.

(Tl at 283-84; cf. P-22.) As an aid to

this Court, Mr. Gallian1s telephone number, as set forth in
Appellant Crane's telephone records, is (801)628-1682.
On the 27th day of February, 1985, Crane ultimately
phoned Gallian and threatened a suit, from which suit this appeal
has been taken.

(Tl at 289-90; P-24)

Later that morning, immed-

iately after that phone call to Gallian, Crane phoned Mr. Bishop's
office in Cedar City, Utah, at (801)586-9483.

(P-24)

Later that

afternoon, just prior to 5:00 p.m. Mountain Standard Time, Crane
once again attempted to withdraw by mailgram an additional criterion of closing set forth in Mixon's letter.

(P-25)

A final

mailgram allegedly waiving any other problems in the closing of
12

escrow was sent by Dean Mixon to Dixie Title on March 7, 1985.
26)

(P-

This suit followed.
The trial court, having heard the testimony of all the

parties,

and,

indeed, having

reviewed

the testimony

of three

attorneys as well as that of Mr. Crane, stated the following from
the bench:
On February 22, 1985 Mr. Crane called Mr.
Gallian, and I believe that he was told at
that time that the deal was off. As it turns
out, however, and as you will find in a few
minutes, it really doesn't make any difference. . . .
Based on the testimony of Mr. Westbrook,
Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as well as the
postmark on the Mixon letter, I find that the
acceptance of the sale terms had not reached
the escrow on the morning of February 22,
1985, but arrived after Mr. Crane had been
told, as had Mr. Westbrook, that the deal was
off. (R 332 at 5-6)
Thereafter, the trial court found that the letter of
Mixon and the contingencies stated therein, nonetheless, formed
little more than a counteroffer which could thereafter be accepted
or rejected by Respondents even had the documents otherwise timely
arrived in escrow.

(Findings of Fact No. 19)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The standard of review under Utah law provides that

findings of fact entered by a trial judge shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.

In light of this standard and the

exclusive prerogative of the trial court to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to note the
13

various contradictions of Crane's testimony, particularly when
compared to the testimony of his two attorneys.

A plethora of

evidence supports the trial court's ruling.
II.

No enforceable agreement was reached between the

parties in a timely fashion; the mail-box rule is inapplicable.
This follows by reason of the fact that Crane retained Mixon
because he was dissatisfied with the monetary terms of the purchase
offer, and further initiated a lawsuit contrary to an intent to
sell; to-wit: the suit for accounting, Iron County Civil No. 85066. As the offer sent to Crane clearly set forth that acceptance
would occur only upon deposit of the fully executed documents in
escrow, the mail-box rule is inapplicable.

Clearlyf

Gallian1s

letters in February also indicated that closing was dependent upon
receipt by the escrow agent of the documents.
III. An offer to sell real estate unsupported by consideration may be withdrawn at any time before its acceptance.
This withdrawal may be oral or in writing and may be implicit as
well as expressed.
IV.

The letter of Mixon, as framed by Mixon and as

understood by Mixon as well as Gallian, constitutes a rejection of
the terms of the original offer and, thus, a counteroffer.

The

additional document requested by Mixon was not earlier requested
by Appellants or their attorneys, and indeed, as interpreted by
Appellants, required both the original of the substitution as well
as a separate, independent document verifying the authenticity of
the former. These documents were not in the possession of Respon14

dents, nor could they genuinely come into their possession.
V.

Appellants did not discharge their obligations in

good faith, and as such are not otherwise entitled to specific
performance under Utah law. While good faith is implicit in every
contract, when an offer is extended without consideration supporting the same, Appellants are required in good faith to timely
accept, without qualification, Respondents1 offer, if they intend
that Respondents be similarly bound.

In this case, Appellant

Crane's actions belie his integrity and should preclude him from
prevailing on appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT;
THIS AFFIRMATION IS FURTHER COMPELLED BY AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF APPELLANT CRANE.
Under Utah law, cases for specific performance have
always required a greater degree of certainty in establishing the
terms of an agreement than is necessary to establish a contract as
the basis of an action at law for damages.
18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).

Pitcher v. Lauritzen,

Prior to July 1, 1985,

Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution specifically set
forth a greater standard of review in equitable cases.

See e.g.y

Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Bown v. Loveland, 678
P.2d 292 (Utah 1984).

Under this standard, the Supreme Court did

not reverse the trial court's judgment unless the evidence in the
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case clearly preponderated

against its findings.

In Adams v.

Gubler, 731 P. 2d 494 (Utah 1986), however, Justice Durham, speaking
for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, noted that even though the
former constitutional

section had been

redrafted,

Rule

52(a),

U.R.C.P., which became effective January 1, 1987, provides that
findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous
. . ."

Id. at 496, n.3.

Thus, regardless of whether the case is

won in equity or won in law, Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. mandates that the
factual finding of the trial court may be set aside on appeal only
if they are clearly erroneous.

Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548

(Utah App. 1987); see also Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d

58

(Utah

1987) .
The second portion of Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. indicates that
due regard "shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

The credibility of

Crane below, evident from the record and the recitation of facts
supra should be duly noted by this Court.

Indeed, Crane con-

tradicted the testimony of both his counsel. For example r although
Mixon testified repeatedly that he had been retained by Crane to
get additional money from Respondents, Crane wholeheartedly denied
this.

(Mixon at 16, 30, 31, 32, 44, and 47)

Indeed, Crane

blithely testified at trial that Mixon f s sole purpose was to review
the correctness of the exhibits and to confirm the substitution of
guarantor.

(Tl at 124)

Further, Crane repeatedly denied telling

Mixon that he was ever unhappy with the monetary terms of the
offer.

(Tl at 127, 129, 131, 137-8, 139, and 140)
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Additionally,

though Bishop spoke to Crane on the 13th day of February and
testified that Crane had told him that the Respondents' offer had
not been accepted, Crane stated that Bishop's understanding was
wholly contrary to his (Crane's) state of mind.

(Tl at 87-88; cf.

Tl at 250)
Not stopping at contradicting both of his attorneys,
Crane's testimony, even in its unimportant particulars, directly
contradicted the testimony of Russell Gallian.

Gallian, for

example, testified that, between the 13th day of November of 1984
and the 22nd day of February 1985, he had no phone calls from
Clifford Crane.

(Tl at 260)

On the other hand, Crane testified

that he spoke with Gallian several times.

On cross-examination,

however, Crane could not even prove one such call through his phone
records.

(Tl at 125-36) This Court should remember that Crane did

not simply fall off a pumpkin truck and land in Brian Head, Utah.
Crane is a sophisticated businessman, having served as both a
President and Vice-President of major communications concerns, some
of them with more than 200 employees.

(See Tl at 115-16.)

Even

in signing the original loan guarantee, marked as Exhibit P-6,
Crane purposely signed his wife's name in a different color of ink
because Crane presupposed this would make his "wife's" signature
look more genuine to the lending bank.

(Tl at 61, 172, 174)

Crane's testimony throughout trial was continuously impeached,
largely in part due to the integrity of his counsel, who were
simply unwilling to change their testimony to fit that of their
client.

As Crane was clearly unbelievable under oath, to reverse
17

the trial court's decision at this time would wholly disregard the
ability of the trial judge to discern and sift the truth of these
matters from the large amount of testimony at trial.
II.
NO AGREEMENT WAS EVER TIMELY REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIE8;
THE MAIL-BOX RULE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
The Respondents' offer to Appellants in November of 1984
was given without consideration.

The facts abundantly demonstrate

that Crane's reaction to the offer, when received, was dissatisfaction with one or more of its material terms.

Mixon testified that

his sole purpose in contacting Gallian was to express Crane's
dissatisfaction with the monetary terms and to get additional
money.

Furthermore, both Mixon and Gallian knew that absent the

receipt of signed documents by Dixie Title the Cranes would not
otherwise be bound by Respondents' proposal.

(Mixon at 43-44; Tl

at 261-62; see also Reporter's Transcript August 5, 1987, R 331 at
20 [hereinafter T2].)

Furthermore, Crane's suit for an accounting

(Iron County Civil No. 85-066, filed February 12, 1985) clearly
indicated Crane's intention to treat the proposal simply as an
offer.
3-4.)

(Tl at 86, 119-20; cf. P-10-A, P-ll-A; see also R 332 at
Indeed, as of February 13, 1985, Willard Bishop, Appellants'

counsel, was totally unaware that there had even been an outstanding offer to purchase Crane's interest.

(Tl at 149)

Point I of Appellants' brief alleges that the common law
"mail-box rule" should be applied to this case, contrary to the
finding entered by the trial court.
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The mail-box rule, in general

terms, is bottomed on the proposition that, in general, once an
acceptance is deposited in the United States mail, the acceptance
is deemed complete.

This rule, however, is subject to a wide

variety of exceptions, and, indeed, an offeror may restrict the
manner of acceptance, provided his or her intention to do so is
clearly expressed. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P. 2d 421 (Utah 1986)
The first sentence in the penultimate paragraph of 77 Am. Jur. 2d
"Vendor and Purchaser" § 22 is dispositive in the instant case.
Therein the authors clearly set forth the principle as follows:
Whether a contract is consummated by the
posting of a letter accepting an offer is
dependent upon whether acceptance by mail was
authorized. (Id., emphasis added)
In the instant case, the trial court found that acceptance by simply depositing the documents in the mail was not
authorized by the offeror.

The only issue before the Supreme

Court, therefore, is whether there is any factual basis in the
evidence to support this ruling.

Both P-8 and P-9 expressly

indicate that the assignment of the Cranes' interest in the limited
partnerships "shall be deposited with escrow agent to be delivered
to buyer upon closing."

(See P-8, P-9; cf. P-16, P-17.) Further-

more, in Gallian's letter to Mixon dated February 11, 1985, he
clearly states his understanding as follows:
Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will disburse
$175,000.00 to your clients and Barry Church
will execute a warranty deed on behalf of the
Partnership for the condo. (P-12)
In P-13, Gallian's letter to Bishop, dated February 11,
1985, Gallian once again indicated that both he and Mr. Church were
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"now awaiting documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title
Company, at which time the closing will be completed and Mr. Crane
will no longer be associated with Timberbrook."

(P-13)

Ultimately, Crane's testimony becomes the most significant argument to sustain the Judge's ruling. On cross examination
Crane testified as follows:
Q
[Read] [t]he second page of both P--8
and the second page of P-9, second to last
sentence.
A
Okay. "The assignment, Exhibit A,
shall be deposited with escrow agent to be
delivered to buyer upon closing."
Q
And you understood who that escrow
agent was?
A

Dixie Title.

Q
And you had to deposit these documents with them, because it's stated on the
documents, isn't it?
A

Yes.

(Tl at 151)

On February 22, 1985, Crane indicates that he expressly
told Gallian that the documents "were all signed and in escrow."
(Tl at 160)

In point of fact, however, Crane conceded this was

really simply an assumption.

(Tl at 163)

The trial court found,

based upon P-19-A and the other evidence before it, that the
documents indeed had not been placed in escrow as of the morning
of February 22, 1985.

(Finding of Fact No. 16)

As both parties

understood that Crane's acceptance was dependent upon the actual
deposit of documents with escrow, and as there is evidence to
support this conclusion of the trial court, the argument that
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simple posting of the documents was sufficient cannot be sustained.

Under basic contract theory, a contract generally arises
"from the time that the agent of the offeree communicates the
acceptance of his principle to the offeror."

See Restatement of

Contracts, § 64, Illustration 2. Indeed, the offeror, in this case
Respondents, can specify the way in which the offer can be
accepted, and an acceptance in any other way is a counteroffer.
See Restatement of Contracts, §61, Comment a at 67; see also
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971).
In terms of the acceptance in the instant case, both
parties understood that acceptance required the actual deposit of
documents with the escrow agent.

The trial court found that this

event had not occurred on the morning of February 22, 1985. This
conclusion is abundantly sustainable, but pursuant to Rule 52,
U.R.C.P. and the case law cited in Section I, supra, Respondent
need only provide enough evidence that the ruling is not otherwise
clearly erroneous. Respondents strenuously urge that this portion
of the trial court's judgment be sustained.
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III.
RESPONDENTS' OFFER WAS EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN
ON FEBRUARY 22, 1985.
Gallian's testimony and the facts and circumstances
relevant to his conversation with Crane on the morning of February
22, 1985, have been set forth above. The trial court, however, was
initially concerned whether an offer for the sale of real estate
could, without more, be orally withdrawn.

The trial court con-

cluded in the affirmative based upon the clear weight of authority
in favor of this proposition.
The initial offer from Respondents to Appellants was
without any consideration. As such, the offeror can withdraw that
offer any time before its timely acceptance by the offeree according to the terms as set forth in the offer.

See 17 Am. Jur. 2d

"Contracts11 § 36; see also Simpson on Contracts 2d "Offer and
Acceptance" Ch. 2, § 25.

In 91 C.J.S. "Vendor and Purchaser" §

28(b), the authors note that no formal notice of revocation is
necessary, and, even were knowledge, for example, of a subsequent
sale of the property to indirectly come to the actual knowledge of
the prior offeree, this alone would constitute a revocation of the
prior offer.

See also 17 C.J.S. "Contracts" § 50(d); Wiliston on

Contracts § 55.
In the case at bar, Gallian clearly advised Crane on
February 22, 1985, that Respondents1 offer had been withdrawn.
The trial court found that at the time this notice was cfiven Crane
had still not performed pursuant to the terms of the offer and,
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indeed, pursuant to Crane's own understanding of those terms.
The fact that the revocation of the offer need not be in
writing was clearly brought to light by a recent Arizona decision,
Allen R. Krauss Co. v. Fox, 132 Ariz. 125, 644 P.2d 279 (Ariz. App.
1982).

In Fox, the plaintiff tendered a written offer to purchase

Fox's land for $265,000.00 on May 27, 1981.

On May 29, Fox

responded counterproposing a purchase price for $486,000.00, and
requiring acceptance by 6:00 p.m. the following day, to-wit: May
30, 1981.

Further negotiations ensued finally resulting in Fox

delivering to Krauss a second counteroffer agreeing to the initial
purchase price of $265,000.00, but reducing the brokerage commission. Acceptance of Fox's second counteroffer was required by 5:00
p.m. on June 3.

At 3:00 in the afternoon on June 3, Fox's real

estate agent, Mr. Riley, advised Krauss's agent, Mr. Carson, that
Fox "was pulling her property off the market or she just didn't
want to sell it . . ."

(644 P. 2d 280)

Thereafter, Krauss, the

offeree, immediately executed and delivered his acceptance of the
second counteroffer at the title company at 4:15 p.m., 45 minutes
before the 5:00 p.m. June 3 deadline. The Arizona appellate court
unanimously ruled that the counteroffer of the landowner Fox had
been validly withdrawn. The language of the court's opinion states
the law which Respondents feel is applicable to the instant case:
Because the counteroffer was not given
for consideration, and even though it was
specified for a definite period, it could be
revoked at any time before acceptance. See
Butler v. Wehrley, 5 Ariz. App. 228, 429 P.2d
130 (1967) (where revocation was not validly
communicated and was therefore ineffective);
1 Wiliston on Contracts § 55 "Revocation" (3rd
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ed. 1957).
The written counteroffer was
orally revoked at 3:00, which was before
acceptance, by delivery of the executed acceptance to the escrow agent at 4:15 p.m. Therefore, no contract was created. Restatement
[2d] "Contracts" § 36 (644 P.2d at 280)
Similarly, in the instant case, Gallian unequivocally and validly
withdrew Respondents1 offer prior to its acceptance by Appellants
through the depositing of documents with the escrow agent.
IV,
APPELLANTS' ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONDENTS' OFFER
WAS CONDITIONAL AND CONSTITUTED LITTLE MORE
THAN A COUNTEROFFER.
In

general,

M

[t]o

create

a

binding

contract

the

acceptance must unconditionally agree to all the material provisions of the offer, and must not add any new material conditions
. . ."

See R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d

817 (1952); see also Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d
903 at 906 (1961) .
In the instant case, Appellants indicate that their
acceptance of Respondents' offer was unconditional. While Respondents concede that some of the so-called conditions of Mixonfs
letter (P-18) may have been implied in the context of the parties1
negotiations, other conditions were indeed material and constituted
little more than a counteroffer.
Gallian testified that on the 8th day of February 1985
that he spoke with Crane's attorney, Mr. Mixon, in California. In
this conversation Mixon requested a copy of the substitution of
guarantor document and questioned the authenticity of the same.
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Gallian testified that he verified the same as a fellow practitioner.

(Tl at 270-71, 284-86) Gallian further testified that on

February 8 he understood that his personal verification of the
authenticity of the substitution of guarantor document would be
sufficient.

Three days later, on February 11, 1985, Gallian

drafted and signed P-12.

Its careful wording is exemplary of

Gallian's understanding of this earlier conversation with Mixon:
Enclosed is a copy of the initial Substitution
of Guarantor which I certify was executed by
myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch, Vice-President of
Nebraska Savings and Loan. (P-12)
In response thereto, Mixon1s letter, mailed February 21, expressly
instructed the escrow agent that Gallian's verification of the
authenticity of the Substitution of Guarantor document was clearly
not sufficient to Appellants. Indeed, Mixon testified that without
a separate document from Nebraska Savings and Loan verifying the
authenticity of the Substitution of Guarantor document it was not
Mixon's intent that the deal close.

(Mixon D-29 at 37)

Mixon

fully knew that his cover letter, as read by an escrow agent, would
be firm in this matter.

(Id. at 22-24)

Even Crane admitted at

trial that without verification, independent of Gallian's, as to
the authenticity of that document, Crane did not intend to go ahead
with the transaction.
Importantly,

(Tl at 149)
the

original

of the

loan

substitution

document was in the offices of Nebraska Savings and Loan and,
indeed, was never received pursuant to Mixonfs instructions.
at 96, 258)

(Tl

Furthermore, at trial, Crane not only conceded that
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Mixon had made it necessary for Gallian to obtain this extra
verification document, but Crane further indicated that he [Crane]
understood that Gallian was additionally required to obtain for
Crane the original substitution document itself.
As a corollary thereto, Gallian testified

(Tl at 144-46)

that, having once

personally verified the authenticity of the document, he would not
have procured a second verification and could not obtain the
original substitution as expressly requested by Mixon as a condition to closing.

(Tl at 285-86)

Beyond imposing this additional condition, which, by
reason of the negotiations, was contrary to the understanding of
Respondents, the trial court expressly found that the cover letter
of Mixon had not made the acceptance unconditional.

(Finding of

Fact No. 19)
Though not expressly a portion of the trial court's
opinion, it becomes clear from an examination of the record that
prior to the posting of Mixonfs letter on February 21, one additional factor had been set forth by Respondents as a condition to
Appellants1 acceptance of Respondents' offer.

On February 11,

1985, Gallian drafted P-13, a letter to Bishop indicating that his
request on Crane's behalf for an accounting on Timberbrook should
be moot in the event Crane sold his partnership interest in
Timberbrook.

This letter was copied to Mr. Mixon, California

counsel for Clifford Crane.

(P-13)

Having not received the

letter, Bishop filed Civil No. 85-066 on February 12, 1985, and
received Gallian's letter (P-13) a day latter on February 13, when
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Barry Church was served.

On the 15th of February, Gallian and

Bishop spoke, and Bishop wrote a letter confirming that conversation, indicating that the offer of Respondents to purchase Appellants1 interest in the partnership had not yet been accepted as a
settlement offer on the accounting lawsuit, and that until Appellant did in fact accept that settlement offer, Bishop had been
instructed to proceed with the lawsuit. This letter from Bishop's
office (P-15-A) was also copied to Appellants in California. Thus,
both Gallian and Bishop understood that a condition to the purchase
of Appellants1 interest was the termination of the accounting suit.
Absent the termination of that suit, Respondents felt no duty to
close.

(T2 at 27)
While the Appellant Clifford Crane conceded that, had he

received the money and the deed, he would have dismissed the
accounting suit, he conceded on cross-examination from Respondents1
counsel that he "may not have11 communicated this information to Mr.
Gallian.

(T2 at 43-44)

Gallian firmly testified that he never

heard one word about the accounting suit being dismissed as part
of the closing from Mr. Crane.

(T2 at 4 6)

Prior to the acceptance of an offer, the offeror may
modify the terms of the acceptance at any time.

Appellants1

counsel, Bishop, indicated that Crane had not accepted the settlement offer on February 18, 1985.

(P-15-A) This letter, copied to

Crane, set forth the materiality of that dismissal to the unqualified acceptance of Respondents1 offer.

Appellants, however,

maintained civil no. 85-066 up to and including the time of trial.
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Appellants' failure to communicate that, as a portion of
the acceptance, the accounting suit would be dismissed

is a

material failure in unequivocally accepting Respondents1 offer as
that offer became modified after notice of the lawsuit reached
Respondents.

Crane's testimony, uncommunicated to the offeror,

that he would have dismissed the lawsuit is wholly ineffective.
What Crane would have done, simply stated, is not enough.

The

acceptance of this condition was material to the offer as it stood
on February 21, 1985, when Mixon mailed P-18 with its enclosures.
Nothing in that letter, however, expresses to the escrow agent that
the accounting suit, filed eight days prior to its mailing, would
ever be dismissed, and a copy of Mixon's letter (P-18), in point
of fact, was never mailed to Gallian.
V.
EQUITY COMPELLED THAT APPELLANTS
NOT PREVAIL IN THE INSTANT SUIT.
The general rule in Utah is that equity reserves its
rewards for those who are themselves acting in fairness and good
conscience, or, in other words, to those who have come into court
with clean hands. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976).
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, indicated
that all parties to a proposed contract "are obliged to proceed in
good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance
with its expressed intent." Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
1979) .

In reviewing the entirety of the pleadings and the tes-

timony before the trial court, it becomes clear that Mixon was
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retained simply to get more money than what Crane in principle had
agreed to accept.

Even Mixon admitted that Crane had initially

agreed to sell for $175,000.00.

(Mixon at 31)

Crane admits to

this oral agreement as well, but retained Mixon solely for the
purpose of getting more money.

(See Tl at 63, 69.)

Simultaneous to Mixon's first conversation with Gallian
on January 4, Crane also retained Bishop, who, not knowing of the
offer to purchase Crane's interest, proceeded diligently to obtain
an accounting of the Timberbrook partnership, finally resulting in
the filing of a lawsuit on February 12, 1985.

While the filing of

the lawsuit alone is not an example of bad faith, the timing of
this lawsuit, coupled with the fact that Bishop, Crane's Utah
attorney, had no prior knowledge of the ongoing negotiations to
purchase Crane's interest in Timberbrook, created a situation which
put Respondents between the proverbial "rock and a hard spot."

In

effect, Crane was attempting to negotiate an increase in the money
offered

by becoming

partnership.

a proverbial

"thorn

in the

side" of the

Indeed, Respondents have urged that the maintaining

of this suit alone constitutes an implied and continuing rejection
of Respondents' offer.

Bishop himself

conceded

that he knew

nothing of the ongoing negotiations to purchase Crane's interest
until receiving Gallian's letter on February 13, 1985.

(Tl at 248-

51.)
Based upon the foregoing, Respondents suggest to the
Court that though the trial court made no finding from the evidence
before it, the actions of Crane clearly indicate a continuing
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unwillingness to be bound by the proposal offered by Gallian.
332 at 4-6)

(R

Respondents suggest that Crane's masked or veiled

intentions, his lack of credibility, and the fact that his testimony was largely impeached by both of his counsel, indicate that
he did not go before the trial court with clean hands and does not,
apart from his counsel, stand with clean hands before this Court.As Respondents' counsel has previously indicated, Appellants's
counsel have acted with full integrity throughout this case.
Appellant, however, standing alone, does not qualify to receive
equity and obtain a decree of specific performance under the laws
of the State of Utah.

CONCLUSION
The judgment entered by the trial court, The Honorable
J. Philip Eves presiding, should be affirmed.

Having accurately

assessed the credibility of the witnesses before itir the trial
court's findings are amply supported by the record on appeal; they
should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Appellant has not
overcome this burden.
The testimony before the trial court clearly sustains a
valid and timely revocation of Respondents' initial offer to
purchase Appellant Crane's interest in Timberbrook.

Acceptance

required the physical tender of documents to escrow, which act had
not been accomplished due to Appellants' own delay in responding
to the offer.
Beyond the above, Appellants' ultimate response proposed
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the necessity of additional conditions as a precedent to closing
and, thus, constituted a counteroffer.

Lastly, by reason of the

ambivalent and duplicitous actions of Appellant Crane, Utah law
would preclude his requested recovery for specific performance.
Respectfully submitted this

ay of June, 1988.
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PAROWAN, IRON COUNTY, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1987

2

12:02 p.m.

3 I

-oOoP R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

We are back in session.

minutes after twelve noon.

Itfs two

The parties are present with

their counsel.
I have reviewed the exhibits which were
10 I admitted in the trial as well as the law which has been
11

supplied by the parties.

12

of fact.

I make the following findings

13

On November 13th, 19 85 the parties had an

14

oral agreement in principle which was to be reduced to

15

writing, signed and deposited in escrow, along with

16

other items, to complete the transaction and thus the

17

agreement.

18

from a construction loan, a deed and assignment.

19

of those items had not been discussed nor settled in the

20

oral agreement.

21

in escrow and a release occurred, but that was not placed

22

in escrow and was not communicated to Crane.

23

Those items were to include money, release
Some

On November 20th, 19 85 money was placed

Nothing more of significance happened until

24

January of 19 85 when Mr. Bishop was retained to obtain

25

an accounting by Mr. Crane, and he notified Mr. Gallian

of that intent by letter both in

1

and others of his —

2

January and early in February.

3

indicates that Mr. Crane did not feel that he had a

4

binding agreement at that time, but was in the position

5

of being in receipt of an offer which he was either free

6

to accept or reject.

7

I find that that action

On February 11th, 1985 Mr. Gallian sent a

8

letter to Mr. Mixon redefining the terms of the

9

agreement, including Crane!s transfer c f the 20 percent

10

to Leisure Sports and the five percent to Timberbrook,

11

and the statement that the escrow agent would then

12

disburse $17 5,000 to Crane and Church would execute a

13

warranty deed for the condo.

14

Also on February 11th, 1985 Mr. Gallian

15

sent a letter to Mr. Bishop explaining his contact with

16

Mixon and reaffirming the existence of the terms of the

17

offer, and stated that the accounting problem appeared to

18

have been solved by Crane's inspection of the books.

19

again asks that the documents which were outstanding be

20

placed in escrow to complete the formation of the contract

21

and "the deal," as he calls it.

22

He

On February 13th, 19 85 Mr. Crane told

23

Mr. Bishop that he had not yet acceptedI the outstanding

24

offer; that he wanted to go ahead with the accounting.

25

On the same date, Mr. Crane signed the outstanding

1

agreements and deposited them with Mr. Mixon, his attorney

2

in California.

3

On February 12th, 19 85 the accounting

4

lawsuit was filed by Mr. Bishop.

5

been completed by Mr. Bishop in preparation for filing on

6

February the 6th, 19 85.

7

I note that that had

On February the 15th, 1985 Mr. Gallian and

8

Mr. Bishop spoke on the telephone after Mr. Gallian

9

learned of the existence of the lawsuit.

During that

10

discussion the terms of the agreement were still

11

outstanding and were not revoked.

12

On February the 18th, 1985 Mr. Gallian and

13

Mr. Church met and decided the deal was off, but at that

14

time did not communicate their decision to anyone.

15

February the 18th, 1985 Mr. Bishop sent letters to

16

Mr. —

17

position of February 13th, 1985.

18

1985 Mr. Mixon dictated the letter which was mailed on

19

February 21, 19 85 with which he sent the signed agreements

20

which he had been given by Mr. Crane for deposit in

21

escrow, and also with which he sent a letter stating

22

conditions and documents that he felt were necessary prior

23

to the closing of the escrow.

24
25

On

or sent a letter to Mr. Gallian stating Crane's
Also on February 18th,

On February 22nd, 19 85 Mr. Crane called
Mr. Gallian, and I believe that he was told at that time

1

that the deal was off.

2

you will find in a few minutes, it doesnft really make

3

any difference whether he was told that on the 22nd or

4

the 27th.

5

determine the status of the release from the construction

6

loan and the escrow file.

7

As it turns out, however, and as

He also called Mr. Westbrook and Nebraska to

Based on the testimony of Mr. Westbrook,

8

Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as well as the postmark on

9

the Mixon letter, I find that the acceptance of the sale

10

terms had not reached the escrow on the morning of

11

February 22nd, 1985, but arrived after Mr. Crane had been

12

told, as had Mr. Westbrook, that the deal was off.

13

Throughout the communications leading up to

14

February 22nd, 19 85 Mr. Crane considered the sales

15

agreement documents merely an offer which he was free to

16

accept or reject, and not a memorialization of a binding

17

agreement.

18

communications to his attorneys and their communications

19

to Mr. Gallian.

20

That is evidenced by his own actions and his

Mr. Gallian, as representative of

21

Timberbrook, considered the status or the posture of the

22

matter in the same way in that he felt that the oral

23

agreements, if any, were unenforceable and that what was

24

outstanding was an offer which Mr. Crane could accept or

25

reject.

Finally, I find that Mixon's letter of
February 18th, 1985, which accompanied the two sales
agreements which were deposited in escrow, was a
conditional acceptance of the outstanding offer, and in
fact created a counteroffer requiring Timberbrook to
supply a new document not previously part of the offer,
that document being a verification of the authenticity
of the release from the construction loan.
The conclusions of law I draw from that
are these:
One, that first of all, whether both parties
intended that an offer and acceptance, I don't think the
law can assume that they had a completed oral agreement,
and in this case they both did clearly understand that
there was an offer outstanding which Mr. Crane could
accept or reject.
Secondly, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving the terms of the agreement and the formation of
the contract, and in this case the plaintiff has failed
to carry that burden.
Third, this quote, "agreement," unquote,
actually constituted an offer without consideration and
was not revocable —

not irrevocable and could not be

revoked at any time prior to proper acceptance by
Mr. Crane.
T ^TTT»T-"CI

"Proper acceptance" under these circumstances
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was the deposit of the signed agreements in escrow.
Fourth, the oral revocation of the agreement
was communicated to Mr. Crane prior to his acceptance of
the offer or attempting to accept the offer by placing
the signed agreements in escrow or by communicating his
acceptance to the offerer.
Five, the receipt of the signed documents
in escrow after Crane was informed by Gallian that the
deal was off did not create an enforceable contract, and
especially in light of the additional condition imposed
on the closing by Mr. Mixon's letter, but instead
constituted a counteroffer conditioned upon Timberbrook' s
supplying the verification previously mentioned.
Sixth, no enforceable contract was created
under these facts because the offer was revoked prior
to its unequivocal acceptance, and the purported
acceptance was in fact a counteroffer which was never
accepted.
Therefore, judgment for the defendants and
against the plaintiff.

No cause of action.

Mr. Hughes, will you prepare appropriate
findings of fact

—

MR. HUGHES:
THE COURT:
judgment?

T
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I will, your Honor.
—

and conclusions of law and

MR. BISHOP:

Mike, are you going to order

copy of the ruling?
MR. HUGHES:

Yes.

MR. BISHOP:

If he will, I would like a

copy.
THE COURT:

Anything further to take place

in this matter?
MR. BISHOP:

No, your Honor.

MR. HUGHES:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

We are in recess in this

Thank you.

matter.
(The proceedings were recessed.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE
CRANE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

Civil No. 85-281

vs.
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HEART iMARKETING and DEVELOP- '
MENT, INC., a Utah corporation, in its capacity as
general partner of TIMBERBROOK
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS,
INC., a Utah corporation; and [
y
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on for trial on the 4th
and 5th of August, 1987, and the Plaintiffs, Clifford G.
Crane and Bonnie Crane, having been represented

by their

attorney of record, Willard R. Bishop, and the Defendants
collectively represented by their counsel of record, Michael
D. Hughes, and the Court having heard the testimony of the
witnesses, having received the evidentiary support, both of
the

Plaintifffs

complaint

and

the

defenses

proposed

by

nn^

Defendants, and the matter having been submitted upon oral
argument by both counsel,
NOW

THEREFORE,

the

Court

hereby

enters

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

Court

finds

that

the

pleadings

were

properly joined for trial.
2.
purchased
Utah

The Court

finds that Clifford G. Crane had

a 25% interest

limited

in Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a

partnership,

with

its

principal, place

of

business in Iron County, Utah.
3.
Utah

The Court finds that Leisure Sports, Inc., a

corporation,

together

with

Heart

Marketing

and

Development, Inc., a general partner of Timberbrook Village,
Ltd., desired to repurchase the interest of Clifford Crane
in said partnership.
4.
1985,

The

Plaintiffs

principle

an oral

writing,

signed

Court
and

finds
these

that

the

of November

Defendants

agreement which
by

as

was

Plaintiffs,

had
to

be

13th,

reached

in

reduced

in

deposited

by

the

Plaintiffs at Dixie Title Company, along with assignments of
their

partnership

interests, and

that

these

requirements

were necessary to complete the transaction.
5.

The Court finds that some but not all of the

items had been discussed and settled in the oral agreement,
but

that

they

included,

among

other

money, release of the Plaintiffs

things, transfer

of

from the guarantee of a

construction loan, preparation of a deed by the Defendants,
and the preparation and completion of two assignments by the
Plaintiffs.
6.

The Court finds that on November 20th, 1985,

the Defendants, Leisure Sports, Inc., a Utah corporation,
and

Heart Marketing

and

Development, Inc., caused

to be

placed in escrow $175,000 in reliance upon their belief that
a deal had been struck and that, further, Leisure Sports,
Inc.,

by

and

through

principals,

obtained

construction

loan.

Mr.

Russell

release
The

of

Court

Gallian,

the

one

Plaintiffs

finds, however,

of

its

from

the

that

said

release was not placed in escrow at this time and was not
communicated to the Plaintiffs.
7.
Russell

The Court finds that on November 13th, 1984,

Gallian, on behalf

of Leisure

Sports, Inc., and

Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., did enclose documents
requesting

their

execution

and

delivery

to

Dixie

Title

Company to the Plaintiffs Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane.
These documents were marked at trial as P-7, P-8, and P-9,
respectively, and were received into evidence.
8.
significance

The

Court

happened

finds

until

that

January

nothing
of

1985,

more
when

of
the

Defendant Clifford Crane, acting through his attorney, Dean
Mixon, contacted

Mr. Bishop, an

attorney

in Cedar City,

Utah, and retained Mr. Bishop for the purposes of obtaining
an accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
that

Crane's

action

in

retaining

both

The Court finds

Mixon

and

Bishop

evidences Crane's feeling there was no binding agreement at
the time, but that he was in a position of being in receipt
of an offer regarding which he was either free to accept or
reject.
9.
thrust

of

The Court finds from the evidence
Mixon's

conversations

with

that the

Gallian

were

to

increase the amount of money to be paid Plaintiffs, but that
in February

of

1985, Mixon expressed

a concern

over

the

releasing of the Plaintiffs from a loan guarantee which had
heretofore been a part of the parties1
Court

finds

forwarded

that

to

substitution
Plaintiffs

by

the
of

Exhibit

offices
guarantor,

were

both

negotiations.

P-13,

Mr.

Mr.

Mixon

of
by

released

the
from

Russell

text
any

a

Gallian

copy

of

The

of

which

loan

a
the

guarantees

related to the Timberbrook Village, Ltd. partnership.

The

Court further finds that the original of such substitution
was retained by the bank.
Defendants
Leisure

Heart

The Court finds that by P-12, the

Marketing

and

Development,

Sports, Inc., once again renewed

their

Inc.,

and

offer

for

Crane to execute Exhibits P-8 and P-9 and return the same to
the Defendant Dixie Title Company so that escrow could be
completed.

In this letter, Gallian once again redefined the

terms on behalf of these Defendants, of what he understood
the

agreement

to

be,

including

transfer

Leisure Sports and the 5% to Timberbrook.
stated

in

such

letter

that

the

escrow

of

the

20% to

Gallian further
agent

would

then

disburse $175,000 to the Plaintiffs and that Barry Church,

an«

on

behalf

of

Heart

general partner
execute

a

Marketing

and

to Timberbrook

warranty

deed

for

Development,

Inc.,

Village, Ltd., would
the

condominium

a

then

which

was

additional consideration in the transaction.
10.

The Court finds that simultaneous with the

transfer of the letter to Mixon, Gallian, by way of P-13,
wrote

a

letter

to Mr. Willard

R.

Bishop

explaining

contact of the Defendants with Mixon, Cranes1
attorney, and reaffirming
terms of the offer.
the

accounting

the

California

to Bishop the existence of the

Gallian further stated his belief that

problems

appeared

to have

been

solved

by

Crane's prior inspection of the books and, once again, the
question

indicated

that

documents to be placed

these

Defendants

in escrow

were

awaiting

at Dixie Title Co. , at

which time the closing would be completed and the accounting
problems resolved.
11.

The Court finds that on February 12th, 1985,

the lawsuit was filed for an accounting against Timberbrook
Village, Ltd., and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a
Utah

corporation,

and

that

on

February

13th, Mr.

Barry

Church, as a principal of Heart Marketing and Development,
Inc., was served with the complaint in said lawsuit.
Court finds that on February
Bishop, his Utah

The

13th, Mr. Crane advised Mr.

counsel, that

he had

not

accepted

the

outstanding offer made to him by the Defendants, Heart
Marketing and Development, Inc. and Leisure Sports, Inc.,
and that Crane desired to proceed with an accounting until

the

settlement was

accept

it.

The

of fered.
Court

Crane did

finds

that

not

the

in

fact ever

thrust

of

this

information^relayed to Gallian orally by conversation on the
15th day

of February,

1985, and

reconfirmed

by a letter

received as Exhibit P-15 over the signature of Willard R.
Bishop, dated February 18th, 1985.
12.
Plaintiffs

The

executed

Court
P-8

finds

that

and P-9, deposited

with Mr. Mixon, Plaintiffs1

attorney

13th, fiSS, %\

February
said

exhibits

in California.

The

Court finds, however, that such information was not conveyed
to Mr. Bishop, Plaintiffs1

attorney

in Utah.

The Court

finds that by reason of the same, Bishop advised Gallian on
February

15th, 1985, that Crane had not yet accepted the

offer based

upon

Crane's February

13th conversation with

Bishop, but that during that discussion, terms of the offer
were still outstanding and had not yet been revoked.
13.

The Court finds that on the same day that Mr.

Bishop sent his letter, Exhibit P-15, to Mr. Gallian, that
Gallian and Church met on behalf of Timberbrook Village,
Ltd,

Heart

Sports,

Marketing

Inc., and

and

decided

Development,
that

the

Inc., and

deal

was

Leisure

off.

decision, however, was not then communicated to anyone.

This
The

Court finds that while Mixon dictated a letter on February
18th, 1985, said letter was not mailed until the afternoon
of February 21st, 1985, as per the postmarked envelope which
had been received

into evidence.

In this letter, sending

Exhibits P-7 and P-8, Mixon also stated certain conditions,

including additional documents which were to be received,
which

Mixon

stated

were

necessary

prerequisites

to

the

closing of escrow.
14.

The

Court

finds

that

on

the

morning

of

February 22nd, 1985, Mr. Crane called Mr. Gallian and the
Court finds that in the first portion of that conversation,
Gallian advised Crane that the deal was off.
15.

The Court also finds that subsequent to this

conversation with Gallian, Crane phoned the bank in Nebraska
to determine the status of the release of the Plaintiffs
from the construction loan and called Mr. Westbrook of Dixie
Title to determine the status of the escrow.
16.

The Court finds, basing its finding on the

testimony of Mr. Westbrook, Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as
well as the postmark on the Mixon letter, that the title
company had not received Plaintiffs1 acceptance as per the
terms

of the agreement

1985.

The Court finds that the agreement states, as do the

cover

letters

executed

and

of

on the morning

Gallian,

delivered

by

said
the

of February

agreements
Plaintiffs

complete their end of the transaction.

were
in

22nd,

to

be

escrow

to

The Court finds that

this event had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told, as
had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the deal was off.
17.

The Court finds that up through and including

the date of February 22nd, 1985, the Plaintiffs considered
sales agreement documents P-8 and P-9 merely as an offer
which he free to accept or reject, not a memorialization of
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an agreement binding upon him.

This finding is evidenced by

the actions of the Plaintiffs and the communications of Mr.
Crane to his attorneys, Mr. Mixon and Mr. Bishop, and their
communications

to

Mr.

Gallian

on

behalf

of

Timberbrook

Village, Ltd., Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and
Leisure Sports, Inc.
18.

The Court further finds that Mr. Gallian, as

a representative of these Defendants, considered the status
of the parties1 dealings in the same posture, to-wit, that
the oral agreement, if any, was tenuous and unenforceable,
and that what was outstanding was an offer that Crane was
considering, but could accept or reject.
19.
Dean

Mixon

The Court further finds that the letter of
of

February

18th,

1985,

which

accompanied

Exhibits P-8 and P-9, and deposited in escrow, in fact, only
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer and requiring
that Defendants submit yet additional documents into escrow.
As a result, the Court finds that Mixonfs cover letter on
behalf of Plaintiffs created a counteroffer requiring

the

Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of
the

offer,

authenticity

that
of

document
the

being

release

of

a

verification

the

Plaintiffs

of

the

from

the

construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd.
20.

The Court further finds that at the close of

evidence, the Plaintiffs moved that Defendants' counterclaim
be dismissed and that the Defendants so stipulate.

31

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based

upon the

foregoing

Findings

of Fact, the

Court hereby concludes as follows:
1.

The Court concludes that both parties dealt

with this transaction on the basis of an outstanding offer
which required acceptance by the Plaintiffs.
while

the Court

concludes

that Gallian

As a result",

believed

an oral

agreement had been reached, the terms of the same remained
subject

to

Plaintiffs1

the

specifically concludes

acceptance

and

the

Court

that both parties understood

there

was an offer outstanding which Crane could either accept or
reject.
2.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff seeking

specific performance, has the burden of proving in a clear
and convincing manner the terms of the agreement and the
formation

of

the

concludes

that

contract, and

the

Plaintiff

in this

has

failed

case, the
to

Court

carry

that

burden.
3.
were

The Court further concludes that P-8 and P-9

indeed

offers

open

to

the

Plaintiffs1

acceptance

without consideration, and, thus, could be revoked at any
time prior

to proper

acceptance

by

the

Plaintiffs.

The

Court finds that proper acceptance under these circumstances
called for the deposit of Exhibits P-8 and P-9 executed by
the Plaintiffs, in escrow at Dixie Title Company

in St.

George, Utah.
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4.

The Court concludes that the Defendants orally

revoked their offer to Crane and communicated the same to
the Plaintiffs prior to their acceptance of the offer and
prior to any communication called for by the agreement or
otherwise, by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants that their
offer had, in fact, been accepted.

The Court finds that

thet subsequent receipt of P-8 and P-9 in escrow after such
oral revocation of the offer, did not thereafter create an
enforceable contract; this is so especially in light of the
Court's conclusion that Mixon's cover letter, received

as

P-18, imposed an additional condition upon the closing and
thus

constituted

a

counteroffer

of Defendants1

acceptance

conditioning

Plaintiffs1

offer upon Timberbrook Village,

Ltd., supplying separate verification of the substitution of
guarantor document previously mentioned.

The Court

finds

that there was no enforceable contract created under these
facts because the offer was properly revoked prior to its
unequivocal

acceptance

and

that

the

purported

acceptance

thereafter received by Defendant Dixie Title Company, was in
fact a counteroffer which was never accepted, and that the
Defendants never reinstated their offer.
5.
counterclaimed

The
on

Court
the

concludes

basis

of

that

the

Plaintiffs1

Defendants
motion

and

Defendants' acquiescence in the same should be dismissed.
6.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 case as

against Defendants should also be dismissed with prejudice

on the basis of the aforementioned

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law; no cause of action.
DATED this _^_f>day of August, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

J J 'PHILIP SyES
district Court Judge
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